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Sieverling: Sieverling: Changing Face of the Real Estate Professional:

Professional Responsibility
The Changing Face of
the Real Estate Professional:

Keeping Pace
Valerie M. Sieverling*

I. INTRODUCTION
Although the practical role of real estate professionals' may appear
unchanged in the eyes of most consumers, the legal duties and obligations
implicit in that role have been the subject of controversial change. Real estate
brokers traditionally have fulfilled roles with duties and obligations determined
by the common law of agency.2 The courts in California have been the most
aggressive in extending the duties of the real estate professional to parties
involved in a real estate transaction. For example, in Lingsch v. Savage,3 a
California Court of Appeals placed the real estate professional under the same
duty to the buyer that the law imposes on the seller when the real estate
professional had the same knowledge as the seller, whether he acquired such
knowledge from his principal or acquired it independently.'
In Easton v. Strassburger,a California court later relied on Lingsch to
extend a broker's duty to a buyer of whom he was not an agent.5 The court
placed an affirmative duty upon the broker to conduct a reasonably competent
and diligent inspection of a property listed for sale and to disclose to a
prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the

* Member, Real Estate Practice Group, Stinson, Mag & Fizzell, P.C., Kansas City,
Missouri; Associate Technical Editor, UMKC Law Review, 1989-1990; B.S. 1981,
Truman State University; J.D. 1990, University of Missouri Kansas City. Ms. Sieverling
practiced as a certified public accountant before attending UMKC School of Law and
now practices law in the areas of commercial real estate transactions, financings, and
other secured transactions.
1. The term "real estate professional" is used throughout the Article to refer to any
professional required to be licensed under Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 339.010-339.180 (1994).
2. Dolan v. Ramacciotti, 462 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Mo. 1970); Travagliante v. J. W.
Wood Realty Company, 425 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Mo. 1968); Larner-Diener Realty Co. v.
Fredman, 266 S.W.2d 689, 690-91 (Mo. 1954); Utlaut v. Glick Real Estate Co., 246
S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1952); Mueller v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 466, 473 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981), cert. denied,454 U.S. 1055 (1989); Herb Tillman Co. v. Sissel, 348 S.W.2d 819,
824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
3. 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (Ct. App. 1963).
4. Id.
5. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 390 (Ct. App. 1984).
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property that would be revealed by such an investigation.6 The Easton decision
was not widely received, and the California legislature, echoed by the courts,
reversed that decision.7
Not surprisingly, the California example, like similar decisions in other
states,8 has led to a rash of legislation to address the obligations the real estate
professional owes to the parties to a transaction. The real estate professional's
duties to the adverse party in a transaction and the potential for the creation of
an unintended or undisclosed dual agency combine to create the most difficult
relationship of a real estate professional. 9
Unfortunately, such legislative efforts have not been particularly
successful. In Minnesota, for example, a broker was found to have breached his
fiduciary duties to his clients, the sellers, by failing to fully and adequately
disclose that he also represented the buyer, notwithstanding the fact that the
broker had provided the form of written disclosure contemplated by the
Minnesota statutes.'0 This Article will focus on recent Missouri legislative
efforts in this area.
I. THE NEWLY ENACTED STATUTES: LIMITED AND DUAL AGENTS,
DESIGNATED BROKERS AND AGENTS
In 1997, the Missouri General Assembly enacted statutes providing for
limited and dual agents, as well as designated brokers and agents." This statute
expressly supersedes the common law of agency regarding to whom the real
estate agent owes a fiduciary duty in a real estate transaction. 2 The statute
provides for the appoiniment of a "designated broker" who is responsible for the

6. Id.
7. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2373-2382 (West Supp. 1986) (repealed 1995); FSR
Brokerage, Inc. v. Los Angeles Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404 (Ct. App. 1995).
See also Robinson v. Grossman, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 (Ct. App. 1997).
8. See D.P. Grawunder, Annotation, Liability of Vendor's Real Estate Broker or
Agent to Purchaserfor Misrepresentationas to, or Nondisclosureof Physical Defects

of PropertySold, 8 A.L.R. 3d 550, 552-53 (1966).
9. See Ronald B. Brown et. al., Annual Survey of Nebraska Law, Real Estate
Brokerage:Recent Changes in Relationshipsand a ProposedCure, 29 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 25,43 (1995); James A. Bryant & Donald R. Epley, The Conditionsand Perilsof
Agency, DualAgency, and UndisclosedAgency, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 117, 117-18 (1992);
Katherine A. Pancak et. al., Real Estate Agency Reform: Meeting the Needs ofBuyers,
Sellers, andBrokers, 25 REAL ESTATE L.J. 345, 345 (1997).

10. Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771, at *3(D. Minn.
June 17, 1993) (the form of written disclosure contemplated by MINN. STAT. § 82.19.5
(Supp. 1998) did not satisfy the fiduciary duties of an agent under the common law).
11. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 339.710-339.860 (Supp. 1997).
12. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.840 (Supp. 1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/14
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acts of the brokerage entity. 3 The designated broker may, in turn, appoint a
"designated agent" to act as the "limited agent" for purposes of representing a
client.' 4 To the extent an agent performs any brokerage services for a buyer
beyond what the statutes define as "ministerial acts,"' 5 the agent is presumed to
be the buyer's limited agent, unless the designated broker enters into a written
agreement to represent a seller or to act as a sub-agent of a seller's limited
agent.' 6 That the buyer is obligated to compensate the agent for his services is
not a factor in determining the existence of the limited agency. 7
A limited agent's duties and obligations are: "(1) to perform the terms of
any written agreement made with the client; (2) to exercise reasonable skill and
care for the client; and (3) to promote the interests of the client with the utmost
good faith, loyalty, and fidelity."'"
A limited agent is prohibited from disclosing any confidential information' 9
about the client, except for certain required or permitted disclosures.2" The only
duty that a limited agent owes to a customer is to disclose all adverse material
facts2 that the agent actually knows or should know.' For instance, a seller's
limited agent may be required to disclose such adverse material facts as: (1)
environmental hazards affecting the property, (2) the physical condition of the
property, (3) material defects in the property, (4) material defects in title to the

13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.710(11) (Supp. 1997).
14. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.820 (Supp. 1997).
15. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.710(15) (Supp. 1997) (Ministerial acts are "those acts
that a licensee may perform for a person that are informative in nature and do not rise to
the level of active representation on behalf of a person" and include such acts as
responding to telephone inquiries, answering questions at open houses, setting
appointments to view a property, and showing a customer through a property being sold
by an owner).
16. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.720.2 (Supp. 1997).
17. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.720.3 (Supp. 1997). In addition, Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 339.710-339.860 (Supp. 1997) do not obligate any buyer to pay compensation unless
the buyer and broker have entered into a written agreement with terms of compensation.
18. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 339.730.1(1)-(3), 339.740 (Supp. 1997) (limited agent
representing sender and buyer, respectively). Note that Section 339.730(1) assumes the
existence a written agreement between agent and seller, whereas Section 339.740(1)
applies to "any" written agreement.
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.710(8) (Supp. 1997) (defined as "information made

confidential by Sections 339.710 to 339.860 or any other statute or regulation, or written
instructions from the client unless the information is made public or becomes public by
the words or conduct of the client to whom the information pertains or by a source other
than the licensee.").

20. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 339.730.2, 330.740.2 (Supp. 1997).
21. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.710(1) (Supp. 1997) (defined as "a fact related to the
physical condition of the property not reasonably ascertainable or known to a party which
affects the value of the property").
22. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 339.730.3, 330.740.3 (Supp. 1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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property, and (5) a material limitation on the seller's ability to perform under the
terms of the contract.' A buyer's limited agent may be required to disclose
adverse material facts concerning the buyer's financial ability to perform the
terms of the deal.24

The seller's agent owes no duty to conduct an independent inspection of the
property for the benefit of the buyer nor to verify the accuracy or completeness
of any statement made by the seller or independent inspector.' Likewise, the
buyer's limited agent owes no duty to conduct an independent investigation of
the buyer's financial condition for the benefit of the seller and owes no duty to
verify independently the accuracy or completeness of statements made by the
buyer or independent inspector.26 Thus, the statutes limit the agency relationship
by defining the agent's duties to his client and by limiting his duty to an adverse
27
party with whom the agent has not entered into a brokerage relationship.
An agent may act as a "dual agent" only upon the consent of all parties to
the transaction.2" The dual agent is a limited agent for both parties and has the
same duties and obligations, unless otherwise provided by the statutes. 29 Except
as specifically provided, a dual agent may disclose any non-confidential
information to one client that the agent gains from the other client if the
information is material to the transaction. 30 However, a dual agent may not
disclose the following information without the consent of the relevant client: (1)
that a buyer is willing to pay more than the offer price; (2) that the seller is
willing to accept less than the asking price; (3) a client's motivating factors for
entering into the transaction; (4) that a client will agree to financing terms other
than those offered; and (5) the terms of any prior offers or counteroffers made
by any party.31 There is no cause of action against any person making a required
or permitted disclosure, and the dual agent does not terminate the dual agency
relationship by making such a disclosure.32
The dual agent is not imputed with the knowledge or information of his
clients, nor are persons within an entity engaged as a dual agent imputed with
such knowledge.33 The new provisions appear to permit licensed salespersons

23. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.730.3 (Supp. 1997).
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.740.3 (Supp. 1997).
25. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.730.3 (Supp. 1997).
26. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.740.3 (Supp. 1997).

27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.710(5) (Supp. 1997) (defining the brokerage relationship
as the "relationship created between a designated broker, the broker's affiliated licensees,
and a client relating to the performance of services of a broker").
28. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.750 (Supp. 1997).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.750.2 (Supp. 1997).
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.750.3 (Supp. 1997).
31. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.750.4 (Supp. 1997).
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.750.5 (Supp. 1997).
33. Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.750.6 (Supp. 1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/14
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or agents affiliated with the same broker to represent adverse interests as single
limited agents without becoming dual agents.34
Although the present statutory scheme expressly supersedes common law,35
the extent to which the courts will recognize the statutory preemption is
questionable. The provisions state they are not to be construed to limit civil
actions for negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of contract.36 Has the
legislature, thus, left a back door for the courts to abrogate the legislature's intent
to supersede the common law governing the relationships among real estate
professionals and parties to transactions?

I. THE NEWLY PROPOSED REVISIONS: THE ADDITION OF THE
TRANSACTION BROKERAGE RELATIONSHIP
With the recent proposal to further amend the newly enacted dual agency
and limited agency provisions, additional issues arise.37 The Missouri General
Assembly has before it the opportunity to make the distinction between a dual
agent and a middleman by amending the current provisions of law to provide for
a "transaction brokerage relationship."38 According to the proposed amendment.
a "transaction broker" would assist the parties to a transaction without taking on
an agency or fiduciary relationship; the transaction broker would be neutral and
would serve neither as an advocate nor an advisor to either party in the absence
of a specific, written agency agreement, provided that the real estate professional
immediately notifies the buyer and seller of his status as a transaction broker.39
In the context of a transaction, a real estate professional would be presumed to
be a transaction broker, not a dual agent, provided that the real estate
professional provides notice immediately upon his "default" to transaction

34. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.820 (Supp. 1997). A designated broker shall not be
considered to be a dual agent solely because such broker makes an appointment under
this Section, except that any licensee who personally represents both the seller and buyer
or both the landlord and tenant in a particular transaction shall be a dual agent and shall
be required to comply with the provisions governing dual agents. Mo. REV. STAT. §
339.820 (Supp. 1997).
35. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.840 (Supp. 1997).
36. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.840 (Supp. 1997).
37. H.B. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (proposing to repeal Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 339.710, 339.720, 339.730, 339.740, 339.770, 339.780, 339.800, 339.810,
339.820 and 339.830 and to replace them with twelve new Sections to be known as Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 339.710, 339.720, 339.730, 339.740, 339.755, 339.770, 339.780,
339.800, 339.810, 339.820, 339.830 and 339.855).
38. Harper v. Fidler, 78 S.W. 1034 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904) (establishing Missouri rule
regarding "middlemen").
39. H.B. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising Mo. REV. STAT.§
339.710(19) (Supp. 1997)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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broker status.4 This notice would be confirmed in writing by the parties prior
to the execution of the contract.4'
The duties of the transaction broker include, but are not limited to: (1)
performing the terms of any written or oral agreement made with any party to the
transaction; (2) exercising reasonable skill, care, and diligence; (3) presenting all
offers and counteroffers in a timely manner regardless of whether the property
is subject to a contract for sale or lease or a letter of intent unless otherwise
provided in the agreement entered with the party; (4) informing the parties
regarding the transaction and suggesting that such parties obtain expert advice
as to material matters about which the transaction broker knows but the specifics
of which are beyond the expertise of such broker; (5) accounting in a timely
manner for all money and property received; (6) disclosing to each party to the
transaction any adverse material facts of which the licensee has actual notice or
knowledge; and (7) assisting the parties in complying with the terms and
conditions of any contract.42
Furthermore, the transaction broker is prohibited from disclosing particular
information without the informed consent of the party disclosing such
information to the broker. For example, the broker is prohibited from disclosing:
(1) that a buyer is willing to pay more than the purchase price or lease rate
offered for the property; (2) that a seller is willing to accept less than the asking
price or lease rate for the property; (3) the motivating factors for any party
buying, selling, or leasing the property; (4) that a seller or buyer will agree to
financing terms other than those offered; and (5) any confidential information
about the other party, unless disclosure of such information is required by law,
statute, rules or regulations, or failure to disclose such information would
constitute fraud or dishonest dealing.43 The transaction broker would have
neither a duty to conduct an independent inspection of, or to discover any defects
in, the property nor to conduct an independent investigation of the buyer's
financial condition.'
The statute further sets forth the acts in which the transaction broker may
engage without breaching any obligation.4 - If a real estate professional wants to
continue an existing agency relationship, the real estate professional has the right
to become a designated agent or dual agent.4 A real estate professional serving
as a transaction broker will not be liable for a misrepresentation of his client

40. H.B. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising Mo. REV. STAT. §
339.710(19) (Supp. 1997)).
41. H.B. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising Mo. REV. STAT. §
339.710(19) (Supp. 1997)).
42. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revised § 339.755.2).
43. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising § 339.755.3).
44. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revised § 339.755).
45. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revised § 339.755).
46. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revised § 339.755).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/14
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arising out of the brokerage agreement unless the real estate professional had
actual knowledge of the misrepresentation."7
IV. COMMON LAW COMPARISON
A. Creationand Scope of the Agency Relationship
Both the existing and proposed statutory schemes depart from the common
law with respect to the creation of the agency relationship. The common law of
Missouri recognizes the duties of the real estate agent to his principal.48 The
agency relationship in a real estate transaction typically is created when the
owner of a property asks the broker to find a prospective buyer.49 The agency
contract may be express or implied.5" For example, in Missouri Real Estate
Commission v. McGrew, a case in which a broker acted for himself in the
personal business of selling his own home, the broker was found to have acted
as a broker for the purchaser because he held himself out as a broker, telling the
purchaser that he was a licensed real estate agent and that he would handle all
of the documentation regarding the transaction.5'
The parties need not consciously intend to create an agency relationship; the
relationship may be determinable from the facts and circumstances of the

47. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising § 339.810).
48. Dolan v. Ramacciotti, 462 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. 1970); Travagliante v. J.W. Wood
Realty Co., 425 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1968); Cox v. Bryant, 347 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1961);
King v. Pruitt, 288 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1956); Lamer-Diener Realty Co. v. Fredman, 266
S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1954); Utlaut v. Glick Real Estate Co., 246 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1952);
Luikart v. Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1932); Walters v. Maloney, 758 S.W.2d 489
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988); American Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp., 671
S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Adams v. Kerr, 655 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Herb Tillman Co. v. Sissel, 348 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Martin v. Hiekin, 340
S.W.2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Politte v. Wall, 256 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953);
Dittmeier v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 237 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951), aff'd,
316 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 941 (1959).
49. Dolan v. Ramacciotti, 462 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Mo. 1970); American Mortgage
Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp., 671 S.W.2d 283, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
a seller-broker contract where the principal contacted the real estate broker to list
properties for sale, solicit purchasers and handle closings); Herb Tillman Co. v. Sissel,
348 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) ("Unless it is otherwise understood and
provided, the broker is the agent of the seller who lists property with him.").
50. Lamer-Diener Realty Co. v. Fredman, 266 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Mo. 1954). See
infra notes 49-53.
51. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n v. McGrew, 740 S.W.2d 254,255 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (this does not interpret the common law duty of the real estate agent to his
principal but defines a broker as one who acts "for another" for purposes of subjecting
the real estate broker to discipline by the Real Estate Commission.)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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particular situation.52 Such facts and circumstances typically involve a
manifestation of consent consistent with the formation of an agency
relationship,53 as in the circumstance of services performed such that the
recipient has reason to know the services are not gratuitous, but are made with
the expectation of compensation.
Actual compensation for the services,
however, is not a requirement.55
The authority of the agent is limited to the authority conferred upon him by
his principal. His duty is "to act in accordance with authority vested in him by
his principal and to follow and adhere to any instruction from his principal in
accordance with the prevailing custom in the community where the broker
conducts his business. '' 6 As a "special agent" for a "single object," 57 he cannot
bind his principal beyond the limits of the authority so conferred. The implied
agency usually consists of those "incidental powers which naturally and
ordinarily attend such an act, and which are reasonably necessary and proper to
carry into effect the main power conferred and which are not known to be
prohibited."5 9
Clearly, the present statutory limited agency provisions shift the
presumption from a seller-broker agency relationship to a buyer-broker agency
relationship. The statute essentially eliminates the possibility of an implied
contract between a party as a principal and agent.6' The statute further attempts
to define an agency relationship arising from the conduct of the parties as one
which arises between a real estate professional and a buyer when the real estate
professional performs the statutory acts of a broker, beyond those defined as
ministerial acts. The proposed transaction brokerage provisions would change

52. Larner-Diener Realty Co. v. Fredman, 266 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Mo. 1954). See
also Mueller v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
53. Utlaut v. Glick Real Estate Co., 246 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1952).

54. Longmire v. Diagraph-Bradley Stencil Mach. Corp., 176 S.W.2d 635, 644 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1944) (citing Windsor v. International Life Ins. Co., 29 S.W.2d 1112 (Mo.
1930)).
55. See Hawkins v. Laughlin, 236 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951) (nurse held to
be an agent of ahospital, notwithstanding that the patient paid the nurse separately from
the payments he made to the hospital for the operation).

56. American Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Hardin-Stockton Corp., 671 S.W.2d 283, 293
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
57. Martin v. Hiekin, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (citing Politte v.
Wall, 256 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953)).
58. Id.
59. Prior v. Hager, 440 S.W.2d 167, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
60. Unless a limited agency on behalf of the buyer that arises, because the real

estate professional performs more than ministerial acts, can be considered a form of
implied agency.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/14
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this result by also requiring the buyer to have entered into a representation
agreement with the agent. 6'
The limitation of the scope of the agency by the present statute and the
proposed statute is not necessarily contrary to the existing common law. The
difference is simply that the duties are set forth by statute. Note, however, that
a real estate professional and his principal may enter into written contracts
containing duties additional to those specified by statute.62 Presumably, the
legislature did not intend to limit the scope of the agent's incidental powers
reasonably necessary and proper to carry out his express authority under the
statute and the written agreement with the client.
With the proposed transaction brokerage provisions, it would seem that no
such incidental powers would arise, because, in theory, there is no agency
relationship. However, the expectations of the parties might dictate otherwise,
and the distinction between a statutory limited agency and a transaction
brokerage relationship may become sufficiently blurred to require the
intervention of the common law.
B. The Fiduciaryor ProfessionalDuty
The fiduciary duty imposed by common law is, of course, a very high
standard. As an agent, the broker has a fiduciary duty to his principal to act with
the utmost fidelity and good faith, to keep his principal fully informed, to make
full disclosure of all facts which materially affect a subject of his agency, and to
exercise reasonable care and diligence in the performance of his duty. He also
owes his undivided loyalty to his principal. He is bound by duties "as exacting
as those imposed on a trustee in favor of his beneficiary. ' 63 An agent shall do
nothing to make the transaction more difficult or burdensome or endanger the
transaction." An agent cannot secretly represent any adverse interest. 65 The
relationship is one requiring an obligation to be perfectly frank and to make a

61. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising § 339.780).
62. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.780.6 (Supp. 1997); H.B. No. 1094, 89th General

Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising § 339.780.6).
63. Herb Tillman Co. v. Sissel, 348 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961). See
also King v. Pruitt, 288 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1956); American Mortgage Inv. Co. v. HardinStockton Corp., 671 S.W.2d 283, 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (an agent has a duty to use

reasonable skill, diligence, and care in the handling of business given over or entrusted
to him); Dittmeier v. Missouri Real Estate Comm'n, 237 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct. App.
1951), af'd, 316 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 941 (1959); Luikart v.

Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932).
64. Adams v. Kerr, 655 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (an agent has a duty
of undivided loyalty and to exercise the utmost fidelity and good faith, to keep principal

fully informed, to make full disclosure of all facts and to exercise reasonable care and
diligence in the performance of his duty).
65. King v. Pruitt, 288 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Mo. 1956).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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complete and full disclosure of all material facts which might affect the
principal's decision to sell his property. 6 The duty of full disclosure not only
prohibits misstatements of fact, but also requires full and complete disclosure of
all material facts to the principal.67
The limited agent retains the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care and
to promote the interests of his client with the utmost good faith, loyalty, and
fidelity-a duty which seems to echo the common law standards. The statutes
protect the limited agent by allowing him to reveal certain confidential
information and defining adverse material information which he or she must
disclose to an adverse party in the transaction. 6' All parties to the transaction are
protected from liability for misrepresentations by others in the transaction except
to the extent the party knew or should have known of the representation.69 In
other words, knowledge is not imputed among parties to a transaction. These
protections of the real estate professional are not particularly offensive to the
common law agency duty and, indeed, tend to reduce the potential for adverse
obligations by defining the real estate professional's obligations to a customer
who is not his principal.7"
Not surprisingly, the more complex issues arise in the contexts of dual
agency and transaction brokerage relationships.
C. PermittedDualAgency
Although the agent is under a strict duty of loyalty to act solely for the
benefit of his principal,7 and to avoid putting himself in a position antagonistic
to his principal,72 and although the agent assumes an "unwise" and "anomalous"
position by serving as a dual agent,73 the common law of Missouri does not
strictly prohibit a dual agency relationship. An agent may represent an adverse
party with the knowledge and consent of his principal.74 Such consent may be

66. Dittmeier, 237 S.W.2d at 206.
67. Id. ("A fact is material ... if it is one which the agent should realize would be
likely to affect the judgment of the principal in giving his consent to the agent to enter
into the particular transaction on the specified terms.") (omission in original).
68. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 339.710(1), 339.730, 339.740, and 339.750 (Supp. 1997).
69. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.810 (Supp. 1997).
70. The extent to which the real estate professional is relieved of his common law
duties to such adverse interests is beyond the limited scope of this discussion.
71. Cox v. Bryant, 347 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Mo. 1961).
72. Utlaut v. Glick Real Estate Co., 246 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Mo. 1952).
73. Martin v. Hiekin, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
74. Cedar Point Apartments, Ltd. v. Cedar Point Inv. Corp., 693 F.2d 748, 759 (8th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); Burton v. Pet, 509 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Mo.
1974); Travagliante v. J.W. Wood Realty Co., 425 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Mo. 1968) (The

disclosure of an adverse interest, "to be effective must lay bare the truth, without
ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance."); Mills v. Keasler, 395 S.W.2d
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/14
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implied when the parties know of the dual representation and proceed without
objecting.7 A dual agent "must scrupulously observe and fulfill his duties to
both" parties. Among those duties is keeping his principal fully informed of all
facts pertinent to the transaction.76
In Hary M.FineRealty Co. v. L.J.Stiers, one of the leading Missouri cases
concerning dual agency, the agent contended that he was a mere middleman and,
therefore, was not subject to the rule that an agent cannot act for both parties.77
The court noted the general rule that if an agent is employed merely as a broker
or a middleman for the purpose of bringing the parties together, has nothing to
do with setting the price or the terms of the bargain, and has no adverse interests,
he may act for both principals and bargain for compensation from both of them.
If, however, the principal is entitled to rely on such a broker for his skill and
judgment, he is not considered a mere middleman.7 8
Harperv. Fidlersets forth the Missouri rule as to "middlemen."79 Initially,
the Harpercourt noted a split in authority concerning whether a middleman is
subject to the rules of double agency.8" The courts in Missouri, according to
Harper, have never recognized any distinction between real estate brokers
generally and mere middlemen." The parties to the transaction, even though
they may bargain for themselves, are entitled to the "benefit of a skilled common
knowledge and advice of the agent."82 The only qualification to the rule in
Missouri is whether the principal knew of the dual agency and consented to it.
Therefore a middleman is held to the same standard as a dual agent.

111, 118 (Mo. 1965); Cox v. Bryant, 347 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Mo. 1961) ("[T]here is a
natural repugnance to the practice of a broker representing both buyer and seller .... );
Adams v. Kerr, 655 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (undisclosed dual agency);
Martin v. Hiekin, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Garner v. Woods, 24
S.W.2d 708, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930). See also Harry M. Fine Realty Co., Inc. v. L. J.
Stiers, 326 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). The court noted that an agent has "the
same duty to act with fairness to each principal that an agent has in dealing with his
principal on his own account. That duty of fairness would require [the agent] to inform
[the principal] of the best price that could be obtained and all other matter which the
[principal] would think reasonably relevant.... [T]he fact that both principals knew of
the agent's double character does not, of itself, void the contract. There must be
knowledge of all the material facts as well as knowledge of the agent's duality to make
the contract binding." Id.
75. Mills v. Keasler, 395 S.W.2d 111, 118 (Mo. 1965); Shepley v. Green, 243
S.W.2d 772, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
76. Martin v. Hiekin, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
77. Harry M. Fine Realty Co., Inc. v. L. J. Stiers, 326 S.W.2d 392, 398 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959).
78. Id.
79. Harper v. Fidler, 78 S.W. 1034 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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The statutes maintain the agent's duty of undivided loyalty by continuing
to require the consent of the parties to establish dual agency. A dual agency
must be the subject of a written agreement which includes the duties and
obligations of a limited dual agent as set forth in the statute.83 Although a dual
agency is not a wise undertaking by a real estate professional, it is permitted
under the common law provided there is sufficient disclosure and consent.
The legislature has attempted to avoid the holding of the Edina Realty84
case by expressly superseding the common law. If the courts respect that
position, the issue of whether the statutory disclosure is sufficient may never be
addressed. When the parties properly enter into the required written agreement,
the required disclosure and consent will exist. A risk of unintended dual agency
remains because of the presumption allowing a limited agency to arise with the
buyer in the absence of a written agreement. Though the safe harbor provided
by the ministerial acts doctrine helps, a seller's agent still can inadvertently find
himself acting as a dual agent by performing certain acts for the buyer. Then he
is in the difficult position of disclosing the situation to both buyer and seller,
risking the entire transaction, or his continued participation in the transaction, if
the parties choose not to accept the dual agency. Brightening the lines between
agency with the non-represented party clarifies the legal position, but is not
necessarily any simpler to apply in practice.
Clearly, the real estate professional in the field would prefer an arrangement
that more closely reflects the practical realities, notwithstanding the legal
inconsistencies that might result. The transaction brokerage relationship is the
proposed practical solution. It replaces the presumption of the present statutes
which favors the buyer when no written agency agreement exists with a
presumption that the broker is a transaction broker; in the proposed statutes a
limited agency with a buyer also requires a written agreement.85
One potential problem with the transaction brokerage relationship is that it
assumes that the real estate professional can perform his activities without
becoming an agent under the common law simply by abolishing the common
law, notwithstanding that the broker may perform acts beyond mere ministerial
acts. The proposed revisions would remove the existing clarity regarding the
consequences of a broker's performing more than ministerial acts (or performing
beyond the scope of a transaction brokerage relationship) but failing to enter into
a written agreement. Under the proposed revisions, what relationship would
arise in this circumstance? Apparently, if the broker's acts were more than
ministerial, but there was no written agency agreement, then a transaction
brokerage relationship would be implied. If the transaction broker then went
83. Mo. REv. STAT. § 339.780 (Supp. 1997).
84. See supranotes 11-13 and accompanying text.
85. H.B. No. 1094, 89th General Assembly (Mo. 1998) (revising § 339.780)
(before engaging in more than ministerial acts, the designated broker is required to enter
into a written agency agreement with the buyer which seems to continue to permit the
performance of such ministerial acts).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/14
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beyond the acts he is permitted to perform as a transaction broker, presumably
he would be acting improperly as a common-law agent, representing a party
without a written agency agreement. Thus, the broker would be subject to
disciplinary remedies under the administrative scheme for regulating real estate
professionals. However, the client could be without a private remedy because
the statute expressly supersedes the common law and because a transaction
brokerage is presumed and consented to by the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
The transaction brokerage proposal challenges all real estate professionals.
The common law has rejected a distinction between the duties of a mere
middleman, who has no fiduciary obligations, and the role the real estate
professional must play with parties seeking his advice and counsel. Thus,
whether the present arrangement, which operates substantially the same as the
traditional agency relationship but requires additional and more complicated
disclosures, will filfill the expectations of its proponents is unclear. Clearly, the
recently enacted legislation does not remove the real estate professional from the
compromising legal positions in which he frequently has found himself in the
past. Even after the Missouri General Assembly has responded to the proposed
transaction brokerage revisions, the state of the law pertaining to real estate
professionals will remain unclear until the courts determine the role of the
common law in transaction brokerage relationships. Missouri and other states
waited a decade or more after the ground-breaking decisions in California to
attempt a resolution. Perhaps another decade will pass before the lay of the legal
landscape truly is settled.
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